

Two approaches to the analysis of judgments of prestige: interindividual differences and the general scale

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Wegener, B. (1983). *Two approaches to the analysis of judgments of prestige: interindividual differences and the general scale*. (ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht, 1983/09). Mannheim: Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen -ZUMA-.
<https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70392>

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Two Approaches to the Analysis of Judgments
of Prestige:
Interindividual Differences and the General Scale⁺

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ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 83/09

⁺Paper presented at the Workshop on Subjective Social Status
and Multivariate Psychophysics, Mannheim, November 12, 1982

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1. Introduction

Talking of social prestige, we must consider the fact that, actually, there are two different types of social prestige. Both types are being discussed in the vast amount of literature on prestige -- but never conjunctively, and nowhere has the attempt been made towards an integration of the two concepts within a common theoretical exposition. Rarely in fact, the distinction has been noticed at all. Thus there is one and the same word being used to signify different substance, and it is this conceptual confusion that might well be responsible for the heterogeneity and incoherence of the prestige theories that have been proposed to date.

What the two types of prestige refer to may become evident by analogy to a basic distinction in the theory of time. In an essay titled The unreality of time in 1908, the British philosopher J.E. McTaggart observed that the concept of time is a two-facetted concept. When referring to incidents with regard to their "timeliness" we have the choice of two modes of expression: One is that mode by which we may indicate that an event X is either "earlier than" or "later than" an event Y, or that both events are occurring at the same point in time. This is what McTaggart calls the reference to the B-type series of time. There is also an A-series. This type of time is being made expression of when we say of an event that it is either a past, a presently occurring, or a future event.

It is obvious that both notions are distinct though both relate to the phenomenon of time; especially, the two modes of expression differ with respect to their relational attributes. In terms of the B-series of time, relations are absolute and unique since an event X occurring earlier than Y, say, is earlier than Y once and for all, regardless of whether X and Y are future or past occurrences or whether either X or Y is occurring presently. In contrast, the A-series of time establishes relative relations. Events being future events will become events happening now, and these will become events of the past and even the remote past, eventually. However, whether they are being referred to as future, present, or past events is contingent on the observers location in time. Thus, in A-type terms, we may even speak of events with a passed future, i.e., events being future events for passed observers but passed events for present and future observers.

Keeping the absolute and the relative characteristics of time apart, has proved to be the touchstone for progress in modern theory of time. I like to suggest that a formally identical distinction should also be applied to the concept of prestige. As with time, there are two distinguishable modes of referring to prestige phenomena; one establishes absolute and the other relative order relations.

With regard to a total society, what is commonly called a prestige order of that society has relational properties paralleling those McTaggart attributed to the B-series of time. When seeking a metric for a general prestige scale we are thinking in terms of "X is greater (has more prestige) than Y" and this order relation is meant to place all members of a society on the scale that is common to all. Just like the relations "later than" and "earlier than" establish a unique order of time, the relation "is more prestigious than" establishes a unique order of prestige. This order is absolute in as much it is independent of any viewpoint or social position an observer may have. Therefore, the attempt to provide a prestige scale for a society as a total society is the attempt to design a structural dimension for that society. It is suggestive to label this type of prestige the B-series of prestige, relating it to McTaggart's distinction in the time domain.

The second type of social prestige is relative to the person experiencing and perceiving prestige. From this perspective, prestige is viewed from within a society, not from the detached platform the sociologist is supposed to stand on. It is the prestige attributed to social positions by incumbents of other social positions. Thus, this kind of social prestige is relative to the person making the prestige judgment, and it is relative to his or her location in society. The prestige of this type expresses subjective order. Descriptors of time may have a relative nature as well, making it depend on the observer's location in time whether events are past, present or future events. Since observers of prestige, in parallel, are themselves situated somewhere along the prestige continuum also, their judgments about this continuum are necessarily relative. What is a "higher" prestige to one judge will be a "lower" prestige to another, and the attributions of prestige both judges are making will differ due to this difference in perception. With reference to McTaggart's distinction, it will be convenient to call this type of prestige, or subjective order, the A-series of prestige, keeping it well separated from the structural B-series.

I am introducing the distinction of two types of prestige because of the consequences it has for the strategies of assessment and analysis of social prestige. Clearly, the order a total society has because it is structured according to the B-series of prestige must be assessed differently than that order that is inherently relative mirroring the perceptions of individuals or groups of individuals of the prestige order. With regard to the latter, the A-series of prestige, methods for measuring prestige obviously must highlight interindividual differences whereas measurement of the B-series should disregard variation, if possible.

Before considering the consequences for empirical research, however, an answer to the question must be sought of how the results of this empirical research are to be interpreted. Instead with one, we are now dealing with two forms of social prestige. Is one more basic than the other? Which of the two types of prestige is that one which sociologists should turn to?

2. The unreality of prestige

It will be useful to observe how the theory of time is coping with this problem. If McTaggart's distinction is accepted, time, like prestige, suffers a duplication of content, and the question is promptly raised which of both represents the reality of time. McTaggart's answer, which has stirred the debate ever since, is that time does not have reality at all, precisely because of its duplicate nature.

In a nutshell, McTaggart's contention is this: The B-series of time taken alone, i.e., the weak order of elements according to the relations of "earlier than" and "later than", is not of specific temporal character. This is so because the B-series does not allow for change, and ... "it would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change ...; there could be no time if nothing changed" (§309). Therefore, aiming at change we are left with the A-series and its relative determination of past-, presence-, and future-ness. "If there is no real A-series, there is no real change" (§311). Thus, if the B-series is to be of specific temporal character it must be interpreted in the light of the A-series permitting change.

But what exactly is changing with regard to the A-series? Clearly, it is the A-series itself that suffers change: future changes to presence, presence to past. Therefore, if change is the necessary condition for the existence of time the A-series is not only the necessary condition for the B-series, in order for that series to be a series of time but, in addition, the A-series is the necessary condition for its own existence. This amounts to a regressive assumption, and McTaggart's conclusion is that time is an unreal entity because this is so.

Turning to the concept of prestige, I believe that the same line of argument must be followed. Formally, both time and prestige are being faced with the same kind of problem calling for the same kind of solution. First, it is apparent that the B-series of prestige, like that of time, provides nothing but a weak order of elements which, in isolation, is of no specific prestigious character. It is simply order based on binary relations and it is defined on a set of elements referred to as "social positions". These positions are ordered because they are associated with greater or smaller amounts of some quantity -- status, money, influence or power, for instance, -- or prestige. The B-series as such does not reveal on which of these ordered properties it is based. Second, paralleling time, the B-type prestige must be interpreted in the light of the A-type of prestige if the former is to become a series of prestige (and not of status, money possession and what not). Put differently, we are conceiving the B-series in terms of everyday experiences we are making when attributing levels of prestige to incumbents of social positions, subjectively. Thus, the A-series of prestige is a necessary condition for the B-series to exist as an order of prestige.

The analogies between time and prestige extend even further, however. Recall that change is the necessary supposition for the emergence of time. McTaggart argues that since the A-series is identical with change -- because future is changing to presence, presence to past -- we are trapped with the A-series for which, in order to exist, we must presuppose its existence already as such. It is inviting to analyze the emergence of prestige in the same vain. For that purpose, simply replace "subjective order" for "change". Clearly, the notion of prestige involves subjective order. However, as the B-series does not convey the prestigious quality as such we must turn to the A-series in order to locate that quality. But due to its relativity and perspective laden character the A-series is itself sub-

jective order. Hence, if subjective order is the necessary condition for the existence of prestige the A-series is the necessary condition for both the B-series -- in order to be a series of prestige -- and for the existence of the A-series itself. As with time, therefore we are faced with a regressive supposition, and paralleling the conclusion drawn within the realm of time we must content ourselves with the idea that prestige is an entity lacking reality.

In view of this argument, it would be in vain to search for an empirical foundation of prestige in terms of observables. Rather, we should conceive prestige as that mode by which subjective order of social positions is being given, congruent to the way in which time is that mode by which change is given. Both modes are inexorable if we engage in subjective social orderings or exhibit change, respectively; but we should be cautioned if looking for empirical facts and matters that are the substance of either prestige or time. Phrasing it as Whitehead would, we should say that both concepts are victims of fallacies of misplaced concreteness if we insist that they are to span their specific A-series as well as their B-series, simultaneously.

3. Status order and the relative order of "life styles"

Accepting this conjecture, what is there left for sociologists to do who are convinced that prestige is an empirically relevant concept? First of all, I think, they should quit calling that which they are searching for "prestige". Prestige is a label that is blurring the distinction between its two component parts, at least there is ample evidence of this confounding in the writings on the subject matter.

Basically, what common empirical studies of prestige are about is this: Respondents to a survey are being asked either to rank or to rate a series of labels representing social positions, occupations for the most part or vignettes of family compositions, for instance. The criteria of judgments the respondents are to apply are usually phrased in terms of the "social standing" or simply "prestige" that is associated with the stimuli. Following that, the individual numerical judgments are handled by various aggregation schemes, simple arithmetic means being the most common. Sometimes, however, the individual judgments are given weights, prior to aggregation, in order to ensure the resulting scale to

extent from zero to 100, say. This is what, for instance, North and Hatt have done in their 1947 NORC study that has shaped much of the research in this area. Others have turned to different methods of transformation and aggregation, Treiman's (1977) attempt to gain a common occupational prestige scale from studies in 55 different countries perhaps employing the most capricious methods of all.

Considering these habits of scale construction, we should be attentive to the fact that in the process of this construction the two types of prestige we have come to distinguish are being exchanged at free will. The basis of inquiry in prestige studies are judgments individuals make about their perception of the distribution of prestige and clearly, what they refer to in their judgments is the A-type series of prestige. Asking people to order social positions will, at best, result in knowledge about the relative and subjective orderings of which individual respondents are capable. This assessment is directed toward the A-series of prestige since it is contingent on the location each individual has within the society the judgments pertain to. There need not be consensus, unless demonstrated.

In contrast, aggregating the individual judgments over an entire population of judges amounts to neglecting the individual particularities these judges were aiming to express. Thus conceptually, the aggregation values represent a different order than that of the individual respondents. Disregarding interindividual variation, we are leaving the A-series of prestige replacing it by the B-series. The B-series, however, stripped of its subject-based perspectives represents simply order with regard to the social positions of a society. The claim of calling it the prestige order of that society is without justification whatsoever. The original judgments of prestige -- which are tight to the particular Lebenswelt of the individual -- have undergone intensive manipulations in the process of aggregation. Thus the aggregated scale does not bear a prestigious quality at all; it is social order constructed by sociologists, and it has as such no merits compared with other variables or indices sociologists compose to quantify social status.

This then is what is wrong with traditional research on prestige: There is a notorious interchanging of the meaning of the word "prestige". The aggregation

scale in order to qualify as a scale of prestige must be interpreted in the light of the individually assessed prestige judgments because these are the only expressions of prestige we have. These individual expressions of prestige, however, do not lend themselves to ordering a total society in terms of prestige since they are expressions of relative and subject-based opinions, evaluations, and perceptions. Both notions, that of a structural common prestige variable and that of personal and group specific prestige judgments, are incompatible, and they should not intermingle at the cost of a category mistake.

In recognition of this incompatibility, the term "prestige" ought to be abandoned from prestige research. There is no object to study deserving that name. Instead, we should turn to two separated social phenomena being of interest in their own right: The status order with regard to a total society, which sociologists are free to design in many ways, and the relative order of "life styles" with regard to subsections of that total society. (Of course, one may instead speak of the B-prestige and the A-prestige, respectively, if one wishes to).

Note that both kinds of prestige sub-terms are ment to be terms of sociological relevance. Whereas this should be obvious with regard to the B-series of prestige as a general structural social dimension it would be unfortunate to conceive the A-series merely as a psychological, if not private phenomenon. The relative order of life styles refers to "stimuli" that are common to a specific group of societal members. Usually these common stimuli will be abstracted roles, "places" in institutions, or social positions in general. The A-series of prestige does not refer to our everyday personal evaluations of people we know or get acquainted with. Personal respect (esteem) or disdain may guide our private actions but these must not be contingent on the styles of life of the persons we are loving or scornful with.

It is of interest to note that all theorists of prestige who are seeking explanations for the structural features of a common prestige scale are turning to Weber's idea of "social honor" at one point or other. Actually, there is a very unfortunate statement by Weber that is being cited continuously and inconsiderately. It pertains to the fact that it is the distribution of social honor within a society that determines the "social order" characteristic for that society. Taken at face value, Weber's remark seems to be in line with the socio-

logical strife for a general dimension of prestige by which society can be stratified and of which its members have different amounts at their disposal. In fact, research on social inequality in the 30's and 40's in the United States, and after World War II in Germany was to a large extent research on how the commodity prestige was differentially distributed among society's members. It was this frame of mind by which the tremendous efforts of assessing overall prestige scales were induced.

It would however be totally beside the point to claim Weber as king's evidence in favour of this enterprise. Rather, Weber's notion of social honor was linked closely to the idea of "status groups", i.e., to communities (of an "amorphous kind") the members of which share a common set of values, traditions, fashions, and, in general, a particular style of life. Thus, social honor is "normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle" or specific status group. It is true that an order of status groups amounts to establishing social inequalities -- by restricting possibilities for social intercourse, by various sorts of material monopolies, and by preferential opportunities excluding all those who are not recognized as bearers of specific conventions and who are alien to the status group in question. These inequalities, however, do not arise because individuals are attributed different levels of prestige on a common prestige scale, but because of the social mechanisms linked to the closure of status groups. In fact, the mere definition of a status group introduced by Weber prohibits that members of one such group are capable of developing a firm idea of the general prestige distribution spanning the whole society because, being members of specific groups they are exposed to the ruling values and conventions that are typical for those groups. Their judgments are bound to be relative. Their judgments of "prestige" are evaluations of other styles of life viewed from perspectives of those styles of life they have learned to identify with themselves. Put differently, social honor in Weber's sense represents the A-series of social prestige, not the structural prestige of the B-series.

This has not kept theorists as well as empirically working students of prestige from interpreting general prestige scales in terms of the A-series of prestige. Different theories give different accounts of what is basic to such an interpretation. If not "social honor", the property that these theories prefer to rest

the "meaning" of prestige on has been named "charisma" (Shils), or "commitment to values that are central" (Eisenstadt), or, as is true for functionalism, "rewards for socially important deeds". But all such interpretations, regardless of how they are qualified, cannot bear out that they are relying on the notion of our everyday experiences of prestige judgments, and these judgments are of unadulterated subjectivity and socially contingent. They amount, at best, to a relative order of life styles. But what sociologists, engaging in the study of prestige, are looking for is an absolute order of prestige. It's assessment is, as we have seen, logically impossible. Therefore the sociologists' idea of prestige deserves to be called a myth.

4. Two alternatives for analyzing judgments of prestige

Turning away from this myth, as we should, we are left with two -- less confusing -- phenomena within the realm of research on "prestige": the A-series and the B-series of prestige proper. Assessing these empirically, will result in a relative order of life styles for the former and an order of social status for the latter series.

Whereas in order to establish the A-series, we must emphasize interindividual variation, choosing appropriate methods of scaling and analyses, the B-series calls for aggregation scales. Clearly, in measuring the A-series of prestige we must rely on self-reports of the subjects the attitudes of which we are interested in; therefore a direct scaling approach like that commonly applied in reputational prestige research is required. Measurement of the structural component of prestige (its B-series), on the other hand, may rely on various methods depending on the theoretical model the researcher is sympathetic with. If however, a direct scaling approach is chosen -- instead of, say, socio-economic index construction or a metric of interaction patterns -- it is imperative to demonstrate that the resulting aggregation scale is a scale that is of relevance to the status ordering of society. In other words, since the B-series is, above all, simply order we must find a way of giving that order an appropriate theory-based interpretation.

For mapping interindividual differences in judgment, i.e., for assessing the A-series, magnitude measurement is the direct scaling method to choose. The advan-

tages of the method, in this respect, have been demonstrated frequently and need not be dealt with here. It follows from what has been said, that we have the choice of two approaches of analyzing data stemming from magnitude measurement of prestige. The first one is aggregation, and the question being raised is whether or not the aggregated scale is a structural status scale. The second approach aims at differences of the judgments made, and the question being of concern in this respect is whether these differences -- if differences are traceable at all -- exhibit patterns particular to specific groups of judges. Assuming that there is evidence for a systematic distribution of styles of judgments of prestige, prestige research has gained the chance of discriminating members of that society, and groups of such members, not because of differences in prestige possession, but because different members in society produce different judgments of prestige when asked to make such judgments.

The A-series of prestige therefore, which of course is basic to this latter aspect, does not qualify for constructing a general prestige scale, as has been emphasized. The individual and group-specific judgments of prestige, however, of which the A-series is made up, may still serve as empirical foundation for a social metric. This metric is not a traditional metric of prestige since it does not attribute scale values to social positions derived from judgments of prestige with regard to these positions. Rather, it provides an ordering of individual characteristics of persons making prestige judgments. It metricizes individuals according to the way they perceive society. The way we perceive the social world is relevant for the actions we are capable of taking in this social world. Thus, the scaling of the A-series of prestige may prove to be a powerful predictor of social inequality -- more powerful than the illusion of the general prestige scale.

With this perspective ahead, let's turn to empirical data.

5. Data sets

The data sets for the demonstration of aggregated as well as individual-difference scaling of prestige I am attempting now originate from two national, cross-sectional surveys in which roughly 4,000 respondents were asked to give their judgments about the prestige of occupations. 50 different occupational

titles served as stimuli. The criterion for selecting the titles was, among others, that the list of titles should cover the full range of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the Treiman scale that is based on this classification as completely as possible. The method of measurement was magnitude scaling, employing numbers and lines. In addition, respondents gave prestige judgments by conventional category rating scales (9-point).

The interviews were carried out by professional interviewers at respondents' home, and they had the format of typical survey research work including various other topics beside prestige. In fact, great effort was devoted to adapting the magnitude scaling tasks to this standard situation of interviewing involving a number of preparatory studies serving that purpose. Also, in still other companion studies, efforts were made toward assessing measurement theoretical scale properties and individual judgment functions with regard to magnitude scales. Means for studying possible effects interviewers have on the scaling results were provided, in addition.

The construction of the magnitude prestige scales followed the procedures that psychophysicists exercise, i.e., the geometric mean of number and line lengths' responses to a stimulus was taken as scale value of that stimulus, for each individual separately. I omit the report of technical results with regard to scale construction and turn to substantial outcomes, immediately -- to aggregation scales first.

6. Aggregation scales

The aggregation scale of prestige is simply that scale that results if individual scale values for occupations are averaged over the entire population of respondents. From our studies, aggregated magnitude and category prestige scales are available. In the terminology introduced here, both represent B-series of prestige. What do they measure?

Based on indices of association with other structural variables commonly applied, this question was sought an answer for by comparing category and magnitude prestige scales with three of such common variables: 1. the so-called international prestige scale by Treiman, 2. a scale of socio-economic indices based on education and income, primarily, and 3. a status scale derived from distributional

assumptions about the frequencies of social positions in a society (Sørensen, 1979). The three scales were chosen because they relate to the 283 categories the International Standard Classification of Occupations provide or can be constructed such as to relate to these categories. Since the 50 occupational titles that were scaled form a subset of the 283 ISCO titles, it is rendered possible to extent the newly constructed prestige scale beyond the number of titles actually scaled if a close fit with one of the three complete scales can be established.

The correlation matrix of Tab.1 displays how the five scales we are dealing with interrelate linearly. The first three scales are "prestige" scales, the mean magnitude scale (MAG), the mean category scale (CAT) that is based on the identical number of roughly 4,000 respondents, and the Treiman scale (TREI). All three intercorrelate very highly which should not surprise us. The relations between the magnitude scale and the category and the Treiman scale, respectively, prove to be non-linear. The fit of these two pairs of scales can be improved if the additive power function (see bottom lines of Tab.1) is fitted. This form of interscale function is always observable when magnitude scales are interrelated with categorical scales. Since the Treiman scale is basically a category scale this form of interscale function applies to this scale as well as to the category scale of our studies. Therefore, the Treiman scale and the category scale intercorrelate highly, of course.

The last two rows of the matrix give the correlations with the status scale that is based on 9 national samples that were cumulated, and with Sørensen's SAS scores. The latter were calculated on the basis of the frequencies of ISCO categories with which they appeared in the cumulated file of the 9 mentioned studies, and they were based on the rank order of the Treiman scale.

As can be seen, the correlation of the magnitude scale with the SAS scale is highest. Thus, if Sørensen's status scale is a true scale of social status -- and this is not only what Sørensen (1979) beliefs in but he has also given evidence for SAS being a better discriminating predictor variable in status attainment models than socio-economic index scales -- then it may be concluded that magnitude scales of prestige, if aggregated, are status scales having the same advantageous features as the SAS scale.

7. Interindividual difference scales

We are looking at interindividual differences, next. Are there interindividual differences, and if so, do they distribute in covariation with any attribute of the respondents who made the prestige judgments?

From all what we know about magnitude scales, it is not surprising to find, first of all, that indeed the individual scales do vary considerably. Some respondents in judging their list of occupational titles exhibit response ranges of 200:1 and more, others are unwilling to extend their range even above 2:1. Expressed in terms of coefficients of variation with regard to the mean value of the individual magnitude scales this coefficient is 76.5; it is only 33.4 with regard to the comparable category scales. Thus, magnitude scales do map variation to a greater extent.

Whether or not this variation in range is an artificial result due to the method used, is a problem that must be studied by determining individual judgment functions. This has been done in one of the supplementary studies which I do not want to go into here. It suffices for the present purposes to refer to the results of that study, in particular, that no systematic relationships between the form of the judgment functions and characteristics of respondents -- especially status characteristics -- were detected. It seems warranted, therefore, to take the magnitude scales at face value and look for differences between individuals and groups of individuals with regard to the A-series of prestige the magnitude scales are thought to express.

Turn to Fig.1 for the presentation of one of the systematic interindividual differences that were found. They allude to differences in range of both types of scales, magnitude and category scales. The total number of respondents has been divided into 15 groups differing in socio-economic status; status being assessed by factor analyzing income, education, and subjective class position. As can be seen, there is a strong positive relationship between the status groups and the range of the magnitude prestige judgments. Respondents with low status exhibit strikingly smaller response ranges than respondents with high status. This close relationship is not observed with regard to the category scales of the same respondents (a correlation of .834 for magnitude range vs. a correlation of .489

for category ranges). Thus, we have a first indication for a systematic relation between characteristics of respondents with the prestige judgments they are giving.

There is more evidence pertaining to the same issue in Fig.2. The two panels of Fig.2 refer to the magnitude scale values of the ten upper most and the ten lower most occupations, respectively. Mean values for these groups of occupations were computed for each individual; the rank order of occupations this classification was based on was that of the aggregated scale. Plotting these values for each of the 15 status groups respondents belong to results in the two graphics of Fig.2. Clearly, there is a difference in pattern. Whereas the lower occupational titles are given relatively higher scores by respondents of lower status groups and lower ones by respondents of the higher status groups, the complementary pattern is found for the upper ten occupational titles. There is a turning point for the most highest status groups with regard to the higher occupations, and likely also one for the lowest status group with regard to the lower occupations. But in general, we find a negative correlation of $-.812$ for the relation between respondents' status and their judgment of the lower occupations, and a positive correlation of $.688$ for the relation between respondents' status and their judgment of higher occupations.

These findings give evidence of the differences in judgment of prestige of respondents who are situated at different positions in the status hierarchy. They definitely call into question any of the theoretically derived claims for consensus with regard to the evaluations of occupations. Especially, the status-reward hypothesis of functionalist stratification theory is receiving a blow, if not down right falsification, when prestige judgments are quantified by magnitude methods, and if the results they produce are analyzed in terms of the A-series conception of prestige.

However, the evidence cited thusfar relate only to the stretching or shrinking of scales; some occupations are given higher values by certain classes of respondents than other occupations, and vice versa, but the results reported up to here do not attack the consensus thesis if that consensus thesis is weakened to just claiming consensus of rank order of occupations. Functionalism, and for that matter, other theories of structural prestige could well survive if they decided

to rest their claims on consensus with regard to the mere rank ordering of social positions and their worthiness. Inspections of Figs. 3 a-d prohibit any attempt of rescue along this line, however.

In these figures the respondents' status is plotted against the number of rank respondents assigned to an occupation within the series individuals had to judge. Fig.3a displays the respective plot for "garbage collector". Obviously, garbage collector is an occupation of relatively low prestige. As can be seen from the figure, garbage collector is given a rank of approximately 13 by respondents being placed in the lower status groups, but a rank of over 17 by higher status respondents. Thus, there is no consensus about the rank of the occupation at all; what's more, the disagreement among respondents does exhibit a systematic pattern, the correlation between respondents' status and rank being almost .8.

For "truck driver" (Fig.3b) the respective correlation is even .92; this occupation is also of relatively low prestige. However, as is demonstrated in Figs. 3c and 3d, the relationship is negative for "judge" and for "high school teacher", occupations both of relatively high prestige. For these occupations respondents prefer lower ranks if stemming from lower status groups than higher status respondents. For "judge" the correlation between status and rank is $-.7$, for "high school teacher" it is $-.73$. These examples demonstrate the dissensus between the rank ordering of judges of different status groups. In general, the correlations of the rank orderings (τ) decreases to the extent the status groups are separated.

These results with regard to the spanning of the prestige perception and the systematic nature of differences in rank order may be summarized in three statements:

1. Judges of occupational prestige who belong to lower status groups are inclined to shorten the range of their judgments in contrast to respondents of higher status groups.
2. Respondents of low status groups attribute lower prestige scores to occupations at the upper end of the continuum than respondents of higher status groups do.

3. Respondents of high status groups attribute lower prestige scores to occupations at the lower end of the continuum than respondents do who belong to lower status groups.

In effect of course, what these regularities amount to is simply this: People making prestige judgments tend to arrange these judgments such as to have their own position on the scale appear relatively favourable. Low status respondents do not score incumbents of higher positions as high as those respondents who themselves are members of the upper strata. Conversely, high status respondents score incumbents of lower positions lower than respondents being members of the lower strata themselves. Both strategies ensure that my own position gains status relative to the image of the social world that I take for reality.

Based on magnitude measurements, the extent of this self-enhancement may be expressed in the form of functional relationships. Central to psychophysical theory (or magnitude measurement theory) is that magnitude responses to stimuli are related by power functions to the metric of these stimuli. For instance, magnitude responses of loudness distribute as power function of the sound intensities that are being judged. In principle, this is also true with regard to the magnitude scaling of attitudes. But we are not in command of a stimulus metric in this case. However, we may try to substitute a stimulus metric by pretending that we know what it is people take as stimulus continuum when making prestige judgments. Thus, we may assume that judges of prestige base their judgments on levels of socio-economic status, for instance. If the individual magnitude responses to occupational titles can be fitted to the scale of average socio-economic status characteristic for these occupations successfully, we have some indication that respondents do in fact base their judgments on socio-economic status they associate with different occupations.

As it turns out, this is in fact possible. Individual magnitude prestige scales do have a power function fit with the average status scale of the occupations judged. There is an average correlation of .79 for these fittings. Characteristic of power functions are their exponents or, in logarithmic coordinates their slopes. In the application being of concern here, these parameters indicate how the response scores distribute relative to stimulus values, and within which range they vary. Plotting the averaged exponents for each of the 15 status groups of re-

spondents results in what is shown in the lower panel of Fig.4 (filled in points). As we see, there is a strong relationship between the sizes of these exponents and respondents' status. High status respondents exhibit a larger exponent than low status respondents. Since the magnitude responses are expressed as function of averaged status scores of the occupations judged, the increase in exponent size reflects an increase of extension of the magnitude scales with increasing status of respondents. Therefore, it is possible to order respondents with respect to their prestige judgments and their functional relations to objective criteria of the stimulus occupations.

The unfilled points of the lower panel of Fig.4 represent exponent values for power function fits based on a different criterion. In this case, mean magnitude prestige values for the occupations judged were computed and the individual magnitude prestige scales were fitted to these values. Based on these scores, the relationship between exponents and respondents' status is even stronger (.822).

8. The social relevance of subjective order

In summarizing, I have been proposing this: The aggregate prestige scale is closely related to a scale of social status that is based on distributional assumptions about occupational frequencies. Since the aggregated prestige scale does not deserve to be called a prestige scale in the sense of prestige being a structural component of the total society, this close relationship with the status scale may justify the claim of handling the aggregated scale like a social status scale. This is a pragmatic line of argument based on the premisis that the SAS scale does in fact measure status. The argument does not imply that respondents actually base their judgments on status distribution because the aggregated scale is an artificially constructed scale, not a judgment scale in the A-series' meaning.

The second conclusion to be drawn is this. Being interested in prestige we must look at the individuals' judgments of prestige; we must consider the A-, not the B-series of prestige. With regard to individual judgments it is highly improbable that there is consensus, rather these judgments are perspective ladden and they express subjective orderings of the social world. When measuring individual prestige judgments by magnitude methods evidence for the relativity of judgments is abundant. Moreover, as has been shown with regard to respondents' socio-economic

status, individual prestige judgments vary as function of that status. This is not only true of the width of the individual prestige scales and the density in which occupations are located on these scales, but also of the rank order which the occupations are brought in by respondents.

Thus it is possible, to quantify respondents with regard to their mode of making prestige judgments. This quantification does not amount to a prestige scale, to be sure. Rather it discriminates members of society according to their styles of social perception. Definitely, the way people perceive other people is of decisive social relevance. It determines what they know of other strata and, especially, what they know of the behavior being conformance to these strata. Compared with high status members of society, those belonging to lower status groups discriminate less in their perception of the higher social positions. They have less knowledge about positions being higher in status than their own. Therefore, their knowledge of how to behave in order to gain access to these positions is deficient as well. Thus, instead of scaling prestige, scaling the styles in which people scale prestige may, if developed further, prove to be an important social indicator.

TAB. 1: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF AGGRE-
GATED SCALES BASED ON ISCO

1 MAG	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
2 CAT	.972 *			
3 TREI	.911 **	.935		
4 STAT	.887	.873	.766	
5 SAS	.988	.871	.726	.959

* .991 : $CAT + \kappa_1 = A_1 MAG^{B_1}$

** .922 : $TREI + \kappa_2 = A_2 MAG^{B_2}$




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

TABLE 1 STATUS GEGEN RAENGE

Y= VAR # 70 VAR. NAME=RAUS NO=0 NIEL 1 MEAN= 1582. ST. DEV= 105.0 N= 15 RANGE= 373
 X= VAR # 1 VAR. NAME=STATI KLASSE 0001 MEAN= 8.933 ST. DEV= 4.454 N= 15 RANGE= 10
 0 CASES OMITTED = 40 IN X OR Y 0 CASES OMITTED BY FILTER VAR # 0 : NO FILTER FOR THIS CASE
 MINFILIT= 0 MAXFILIT= 0 DEIGHT VAR= 0 PEAPG. R= 0.7666 REG. STAT= A = 1418.60 B= 18.2608





FIGURE 3 A

TABLE 2 STATUS GEREN PAI'IDE

Y= VAR # 67 VAR. NAME=RAUS 00-0 FFRH 1 MEAN= 1209. ST. DEV= 137.3 N= 15 RANGE= 502
 X= VAR # 1 VAR. NAME=STATI KLASSE 0001 MEAN= 0.033 ST. DEV= 4.434 N= 15 RANGE= 16
 0 CASES OMITTED = 00 IN X OR Y 0 CASES OMITTED BY FILTER VAR # 0 : NO FILTER FOR THIS CASE
 MINFILT= 0 MAXFILT= 0 HEIGHT VAR= 0 PEAPS. R= 0.9174 REG. STAT= A = 955.297 B= 28.3046



1

41
45 5

FIGURE 3 C

Y = VAR # 12 VAR. NAME = QANZ 74 STUD
 X = VAR # 1 VAR. NAME = STAT1 KLASST
 0 CASES OMITTED BY FILTER - 0 IN X OR Y
 0 MAXFIT =
 0 MEANS. R = -0.7204 (LOG. STAT = A = 969.998
 0 CASES OMITTED BY FILTER VAR #
 0 : NO FILTER FOR THIS CASE
 MEAN = 150.9 ST. DEV = 81.40 N = 15 RANGE = 60.7
 MEAN = 4.953 ST. DEV = 4.450 N = 15 RANGE = 16
 0.001
 H = -13.3557




FIGURE 3 D




FIGURE 4

ZUMA-Arbeitsberichte

- 80/15 Gerhard Arminger, Willibald Nagl, Karl F. Schuessler
Methoden der Analyse zeitbezogener Daten. Vortragsskripten der ZUMA-Arbeitstagung vom 25.9.-5.10.79
- 81/07 Erika Brückner, Hans-Peter Kirschner, Rolf Porst, Peter Prüfer, Peter Schmidt
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ALLBUS-Bibliographie (1. Fassung, Stand: 30.06.82)
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Methodenbericht zum "ALLBUS 1982"
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Two approaches to the analysis of judgments of prestige: Interindividual differences and the general scale
- 83/10 Rolf Porst
ALLBUS-Bibliographie (2. Fassung, Stand: 30.06.83)
- 83/11 Rolf Porst
Synopsis der ALLBUS-Variablen. Die Systematik des ALLBUS-Fragenprogramms und ihre inhaltliche Ausgestaltung im ALLBUS 1980 und ALLBUS 1982